ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Although the formation of the UN was intended to deal with inter-state warfare, it is being required more and more often to respond to intra-state instability and conflict. In those conflicts the main aim, increasingly, is the destruction not just of armed forces, but of civilians and even entire ethnic groups. Conflict in the African environment poses a major challenge to UN efforts designed to ensure global peace, prosperity and human rights for all.
In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted with armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in 8 million refugees and displaced persons.
The consequences of those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its people. J
In a broader context the end of the Cold War has not resulted in worldwide peace and stability. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar and multifaceted world has in fact reduced the risk of conventional inter-state wars, but has been the cause of several intra-state armed conflicts with an even higher risk of regional instability. Such conflicts and the resurgence of a global activism have produced a dramatic growth in peacekeeping requirements since the end of the previous decade. The international response, mainly through the UN, has been to promote preventive diplomacy and, in a number of cases, to conduct peace-support operations.
In this regard, UN operations swiftly moved from traditional military peacekeeping tasks to multidimensional operations in "failed" and disintegrating states.
Research in the field of peacekeeping has focused on a wide range of issues and has attracted a large academic o following. Much of this research has concentrated on what is theoretically desirable, whereas the political and practical implications have often been neglected. This has promoted high expectations of the peacekeeping role of the UN that cannot necessarily be met.
In the following analysis, an overview is given of the authority and competence to establish peace-support operations, as well as an outline of the reasons for involvement in peace-support operations. This is followed by an analysis of completed UN peace-support operations in Africa with special reference to the factual situation regarding the strength, fatalities and expenditures of each operation.
The multiplicity of inputs needed to conduct peace-support operations is subsequently addressed by focusing on the UN experience in Liberia. Finally, an attempt is made to provide greater clarity with regard to the direction of future UN peacekeeping in the African context.
This article is not an attempt to sketch a gloomy picture of international peace-support operations in Africa and further afield. Nor is it an effort to allude to the shortcomings of the African continent in the international community. Rather, it is an attempt to assess the challenges and perils associated with peace-support operations in general and Africa in particulm:.
In a similar vein, it is an effort to reflect upon the magnitude and implications of UN peace-support operations with specific reference to the African continent.
AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE TO ESTABLISH UN PEACE-SUPPORT OPERA nONS
The first of the objectives of the UN listed in its Charter is "to maintain international peace and security, and to this end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". Concrete
Scientia Militaria -28( 1) 1998 measures to achieve this purpose that are to be taken by the UN Security peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding as a range of options to be considered in the context of peace-support activities. None of these concepts were really new, but were presented as a range of options to be considered in the context of peace-support activities. In the report, the terms "preventive diplomacy", "peacemaking", "peacekeeping" and "post conflict peacebuilding" were defined as follows:
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• Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
• Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in
Chapter VI of the Charter of the UN.
• Peacekeeping is the development of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is also a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.
• Post-conflict peacebuilding is action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
It is noteworthy that "peacemaking" refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. As with "preventive diplomacy", or "preventive action", as it is currently referred to by the Secretary-General of the UN, the UN can playa role only if the parties to the dispute agree that it should do so. Peacemaking thus excludes the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities, an activity that in UN parlance is referred to as "peace enforcement".6 The notion "peace-support operations"
is now widely used in doctrine, for example, in documents of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to cover all "peacekeeping", "peace enforcement" and related operations. In Rwanda, for example, a three-year UN 'peacekeeping' operation failed to halt ethnic genocide that resulted in between 500 000 and one million deaths. In spite of the UN's efforts to restore peace, a silent genocide continued in Rwanda.
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In view of the above, cognisance must be taken of the fact that Europe is by no means an island of peace. There remain a number of unsolved and deeply-rooted tensions and potential conflicts.
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These factors are likely to have significant implications for the commitment or willingness of European countrieswhich form a most important part of the resource base of the UN -to take part in multinational efforts to restore stability and security on the African continent in the short to medium-term.
In the case of the US it would seem that Africa's physical remoteness from the core of US interests has not encouraged a proper focus on the challenges or the means to address African conflicts. For example, in 1995 the US was celebrating the Dayton Accord that brought an end to the destructive war in the former Yugoslavia; a conflict that recorded the deaths of 250 000 people. In more or less the same period, between 1992 and 1994, at least 500 000 people died in Angola -twice the number in half the time -and no less were massacred inca few months during 1994, in Rwanda.
However, the US did not address these conflicts with the same apparent focus and energy.40 At the same time, it must be remembered that the US vividly recalls the peace-support operation in Somalia in 1993 where 18
American soldiers were killed and a US soldier was being dragged through 
The Liberian peacekeeping effort
The magnitude of peace-support operations places an extremely high premium on UN administration, organisation, co-ordination and resources. The many Security Council resolutions were basically the result of persistent instability, continuing factional hostilities and an uncertain commitment of the country's political leaders to furthering the peace process.
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• Special representatives of the Secretary-General and Heads of Mission
The effectiveness of any UN operation is inextricably tied to the quality of its command-and-control arrangements in-theater and to the quality of the In addition, the following persons served respectively as force commanders of the mission:
October 1993 to May 1995 December 1995 to June 1996 June to December 1996 December 1996 to Seotember 1997
• Strength
The intensely political character of contemporary peace-support tasks and frequent mandate renewals by the Security Council often involve changes to the composition of a mission. In Liberia, the strength of the UN mission had to be determined in accordance with fluctuating circumstances and comprised the following staff components: 
• Contributions of military personnel
The independent states that are signatories to the UN Charter form the resource base of the UN. The military personnel who serve in peacesupport operations are thus provided by the member states on a voluntary basis -albeit for different reasons or motivating factors. In Liberia, the following countries helped to staff the UN mission:
Appraisal and evaluation
In the context of the preceding, it goes without saying that peacesupport operations generally involve a magnitude of inputs to be arranged Although the political will of member states is fundamentally related to perceptions of national interest, it is not, however, immutable. The perceived effectiveness of the UN itself is one of the factors that can influence it. This relates, then, to the assumption that there is a direct relationship between the effectiveness of the UN as an institution and the willingness of member states to commit political resources and capital to enhance international peace-support activities. Some of these problems were a result of the protracted process of obtaining financing for the mission, followed by a long procurement process for supplies and equipment. A delay in appointing a Chief Administrative
Officer early in the mission's life added to these problems. In addition, troops for UNAMIR were scarce. During the first phase of the mission, the only offer of troops for logistical support came from Bangladesh. The UN had no choice but to accept, even though it was apparent that the Bangladeshi battalion did not have a sufficient resource base to provide the logistical support needed.
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It should furthennore be noted that as a result of unpaid contributions to peacekeeping accounts the UN has struggled to settle a $1 billion debt in 1996/97 owed to 81 member states which provided troops and equipment.
At the end of 1996, the UN owed Pakistan $67 million and India $58 million for their contributions to peace-support operations. Understandably, member states have become sensitive about high costs and are more reluctant to participate in peace-support operations in the light of a UN budget deficit.
49
The financial restraints under which the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has had to operate in recent years, both because of the increase in the number of intra-state conflicts and the failure of states to make their payments, have inhibited effective action on the part of the world body. On a positive note, it would seem that progress has been made recently towards resolution of the latter problem 50 and it is hoped that a satisfactory outcome will emerge in future. In the final analysis, it must be realised that the real cost of peace-support operations must ultimately be measured against the cost of the alternative -war.
What is significant in view of the above is the point that the UN now seems prepared to hand over responsibility for peace and security to willing regional organisations and alliances. In the case of UNOMIL, the more robust 'peacekeeping' was done by ECOMOG, while the UN mission was deployed to observe the 'peace-keepers' as well as the belligerents.
Moreover, the Security Council has stretched the UN Charter to its limits as regards peacekeeping in the Central African Republic, when the InterAfrican Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB) was mandated on 6 August 1997 to take responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. As far as the UN was concerned, UN member states were not assessed for any portion of the mission costs which had to be borne by the participating countries. would seem that the organisation is eager to add momentum to Africa's renewed quest for peace and greater prosperity. Three aspects are of special relevance:
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FUTURE UN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING
• The Secretary-General holds the view that under the right conditions, UN peace-support operations can make the difference between peace and war in Africa. However, his view includes the realisation that UN peacekeeping will not always be the best answer to every problem in Africa or elsewhere. Yet, where opportunities in Africa arise, the international community should provide its support, demonstrating its commitment to peace in a tangible way.
• Most important is the Secretary-General's view that the provision of support for regional and sub-regional initiatives is regarded as both necessary and desirable. It is necessary because the UN lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is also desirable because, wherever possible, the international community should strive to complement rather than Scientia Militaria -28( I) 1998 • The view is also held that wide disparities in the international community's commitment to preventing or containing conflicts in different regions impede the ability of the UN to promote a stable and just international order anywhere. Member states must therefore be engaged in terms of political will and practical resources if the viability of the UN and the principle for which it stands are to be safeguarded, let alone advanced.
In addition, summoning the necessary political will is at stake.
According to Khopi Annan, this relates to two aspects:
• Firstly, that Africa must demonstrate the will to rely upon political rather than military responses to problems. African countries must likewise summon the will to take good governance seriously, ensuring human rights and the rule of law, strengthening democratisation and promoting transparency in public administration.
• Secondly, political will is also needed from the international community.
Where the international community is committed to making a difference, it has proved that significant and rapid transformation can be achieved.
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It is furthermore realised that the credibility of the UN in Africa to a great extent depends upon the international community's willingness to act and to explore new means of advancing the objectives of peace and security on the continent. It is therefore important for the organisation to be guided by lessons from its experience in Africa in order to support the continent in the search for economic and political progress. 52 It must furthermore be realised that the continent's physical remoteness from the core of Western interests does not encourage a proper focus on the challenges or the means to address them. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the real impact of the post-Cold War era is that the burden of resolving African conflicts rests more and more on Africans themselves. African countries and organisations are therefore compelled to take measures and develop strategies to address the peacekeeping requirements on the continent. This would imply that the practice of deploying regional and sub-regional peace forces might become of increasing relevance and significance in the African context. However, poverty in a large number of countries reduces their ability to deal effectively with intra-state conflicts.
CONCLUSION
As a result, the UN and the Western world are likely to be saddled with at least the material cost of UN peace-support operations on the African continent in the foreseeable future. 
